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Context, meaning, and Interpretation,
in a practical approach to linguistics
Arie Verhagen
In discussions of the relation between language use and context, it is often
assumed or imphed that meaning may vary with the context-of-utterance It can
be argued, however, that this must be a misconceptwn hnguistic meamngs
must be taken äs general, mamtaimng thetr identity m different contexts
Section 2 provides arguments for this position, from the perspective that
formulatwns of meamngs are to function, m a non-circular way, m analyses
of actual instances of language use (whether for evaluative or descriptive
purposes)
On the other hand, it is argued m section 3 on partly similar grounds that
hnguistic meamngs are context-dependent m the sense that they contam Open
places' which can only be filled m actual contexts Therefore the (constant,
general) meaning of hnguistic elements never exhausts the Interpretation of
actual usage events
As a consequence, the relation between meamngs and interpretations cannot
be such that the former are 'buildmg blocks' of the latter Rather, meamngs
have to be taken äs comtraints on interpretations For processes of
Interpretation, features ofthe context-of-utterance (whether itself hnguistic or
not) can equally be taken äs constramts on Interpretation, workmg m parallel
with the hnguistic features ofthe utterance, which suggests a view ofutterance-
interpretation äs a constramt satisfaction process (section 4)
"The theoretical notion of the context-of-utterance is based of course upon a pre-theoretical
notion of context [ ] to which we constantly appeal m the everyday use of language Asked
by a child or a foreigner what a particular word means, we are frequently unable to answer
his question without first gettmg him to supply some Information about the context m which
he has encountered the word m question We will also say, pre-theoretically, that a certain
lexeme, expression or utterance is appropnate or mappropnate, or that it is more or less
effective than another, m a certam context The problem is to explicate this pre-theoretical,
intuitive, notion of context m a theoretically satisfymg way " (Lyons 1977 572)
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l Introduction*
John Lyons' first example quoted above for illustratmg that we constantly appeal
to the notion of context m our everyday use of language, suggests that meanmg is
often, if not always, context-dependent we are m general unable to exphcate what
a word means without refemng to some context of use However, the second
example suggests precisely the opposite, that is, meanmg is context-mdependent
For claimmg that a certam expression is (m)appropnate m some context seems to
require that we know what it means mdependently of this particular context of use
So, äs Lyons m fact pomts out at the very begmning of the first volume of
Semantics, 'meanmg' is also a pre-theoretical notion in need of exphcation What
is more, it seems that both exphcations will have to be mterdependent Lyons'
illustrations of how 'context' is used m everyday language reveal a paradox, its
resolution requires that we contmuously balance exphcations of 'context' and
'meanmg' with respect to their consequences for each other '
It is this paradox that constitutes the topic of this paper More precisely, the
problem is that each of the following Statements seems to claim "what a word
means", each seems to make perfect sense on its own, but together they imply a
contradiction
I Here the word X means A, but there it does not mean A, but rather B
II Since the word X means A, it can/cannot be used m this context
An example of I might be
Γ In He hasn t reached Utrecht yet, the word yet means "by now" (Dutch translation nog
French translation dejä), but m Yet he hasn t reached Utrecht, it means 'contrary to
expectations" (Dutch translation loch, French translation quand meme)
And an example of II might be
ΙΓ Since the word yet means (somethmg hke) "There is a rule or regulanty according to which
an imphcit proposition p evoked by this utterance would normally be true at the time of the
utterance, but p is not established äs true m this case", it is naturally used m questions,
negatives, and other contrast-evokmg clauses, but not m simple positive assertives
It will be obvious that in these Statements, different things are meant by the phrase
"the word yet means X" The exact reason why they are contradictory need not be
obvious, though The point seems to be the following Statements of type I all say,
I would like to thank Leo Lentz for useful comments on a previous version of this paper,
and Henk Pander Maat for stimulating discussions on the ideas contamed m it Naturally,
the responsibility for all of it remains completely my own
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in one way or another, that meaning may vary with contexts. Type II Statements,
on the other band, all presuppose a defmable meaning that remains constant in
divergent contexts; for a type II Statement to go through it must be assumed that
X preserves its meaning A across contexts. This presupposition, however,
contradicts the other Statement.
Now in view of specific examples like Γ and ΙΓ, one way to proceed might be
to take the issue äs an empirical one, for example äs the issue of determining both
the factors that influence, and those that limit variability, so that Γ and II' can both
be taken äs true, without contradiction. However, I hope to show that it may also
be useful not to take off into empirical research immediately, and wonder whether
(part of) the issue might not already be resolved by looking carefully how we use
our terms and concepts in these Statements, examining potential inconsistencies. We
may note, for example, that both I and II contain the phrase "X means A", and that
this at least suggests that what goes into the slots for X and A are the same kind of
things in both cases, but that this may actually not be the case when the use of such
Statements is considered more carefully.
One additional reason for taking this course is that in the empirical approach,
much depends on the way meanings and contexts are formulated. As the examples
I and II already show, certain choices in such formulations will naturally favor one
type of Statement over the other, thus begging the question how the two notions
should actually be related. In other words: in order for an empirical clarification of
the issue to be relevant, some conceptual clarification of what we mean by
"meaning" and "context" is needed anyhow.
Conceptual clarification is to be guided by considerations of consistency, usefulness
for theory formulation, and the like. However, we need some idea of the purposes
of the conceptual framework to evaluate usefulness in this sense. Here, much
depends on very general views on the nature of science, on the Status of theories,
what counts äs serious problems, etcetera. In what follows, I adopt an instrumental
view of language sciences, in the sense that they may be evaluated for their
capacity to contribute to the solution of problems external to linguistics proper, such
äs the Interpretation of texts, the construction of dictionaries, translation, language
teaching, etcetera.2 In general, I will discuss the role of the concepts "meaning"
and "context" from two perspectives: first, the perspective of evaluating the quality
of instances of language use and designing advice on proper usage; second, that of
'simply' describing language use. As will become apparent, I ultimately want to
claim that, despite the differences in these perspectives, the respective roles of
"meaning" and "context" are in fact highly similar in these two kinds of practices.
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2 The necessity of context-independence
2.1 In evaluation
So let us consider the Situation that we want to evaluate, in a rational way, the
quality of an instance of linguistic communication. Such an evaluation necessarily
depends on the functions that the utterances involved are supposed to perform in
their specific contexts. We therefore need to have insight into such context-
dependent functions of linguistic communication, for any evaluation to make sense.
I wish to argue in this section that this very goal in fact also makes it necessary to
develop some context-independent evaluation Instruments.
Suppose we produce an analysis of the functions that some text is to perform in a
specific Situation, in order to derive from them certain constraints on the way the
text is to be formulated, or in order to evaluate an existing text (for my purposes
in this paper these two practices may actually be equated). This Situation is
schematized in Figure 1.
Figure l
Is such a procedure possible? In practice, people may seem to proceed along such
lines, but always a crucial assumption is involved: one must know what kinds of
requirements for formulations are at all possible. In analyzing (intended) functions
of a text in its context, one uses all kinds of concepts and categories to label the
desired distinctions. The question is: how to choose these distinctions? Ultimately
they must lead to Statements on appropriate and less appropriate formulations, so
they will have to be attuned to (i.a.) properties of formulations, i.e. linguistic
features like words, morphemes, constructions, linear order, accent, Intonation, and
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combmations of any of these Consider a purported advisory Statement of the
followmg form
(1) Iffunction X is mtended choose formulalion Υ
Any such Statement is vacuous if estabhshmg a well-reasoned link between X and
Υ is not possible If one chooses X m such a way that no link with a formulation
can be established, i e with a set of hnguistic features Y, then X is useless for the
purpose of evaluatmg (or givmg advice on) formulations In other words, in such
a case distmguishing X is not instrumental To give a (fictitious) example one
should not make a distmction between an alleged function of 'addressmg one's first
born son', and one of 'addressmg one's other children' in case this difference never
systematically relates to a set of hnguistic features, at least not for the purpose ot
evaluatmg an mstance of a form of address Similarly, distmguishing between the
functions 'addressmg intimates' and 'addressmg others' for purposes of evaluatmg
language use, is justified only because it may be related systematically (not
necessarily m a one-to-one fashion) m a particular language/culture to some set of
hnguistic features, such äs French tu vs vous Even widely accepted general
distinctions such äs between 'mforming' and 'persuadmg' ultimately require such
justification, which presupposes some systematic relation to hnguistic features, ;/
such distinctions are supposed to play a role in evaluatmg language in use
The latter proviso is important, by the way There may be other textual features
for which certam functional distinctions could turn out to be more relevant than for
formulations A clear example, m rhetoncal terms, could be 'inventio' Texts may
differ systematically m their subject matter, adequate selection of Contents is an
important aspect of evaluation, and there may be specific functional distinctions
systematically related to it3
Generahzmg all Uns, we may conclude that m a perspective of evaluatmg
hnguistic usage, the selection of communicative functions — äs aspects of the
contexts m which a piece of discourse is to be used4 — must be constramed by the
(sets of) hnguistic features available to the users of the language, äs members of a
hnguistic and cultural Community
The argument so far is that evaluative and advisory Statements on formulations can
never be derived from functions only, such Statements are, stnctly speaking, always
based on ideas about properties of formulations too Sometimes the procedure
depicted m figure l seemmgly gives an adequate descnption of some process of
producmg evaluations, for mstance when (almost) all time the analyst is spendmg
m the process is actually allocated to determmmg a relevant mventory of functions
But it will never actually be an adequate descnption of all that is required for the
vahdation of the evaluative Statements produced äs Output This will always also
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involve assumptions about properties of formulations, whether these are made
explicitly, or left implicit. Figure 2 therefore gives a better picture of the logic of
producing evaluations of usage.
Figure 2
Let us consider a concrete case at this point, concerning the evaluation of the
passive voice. Any evaluative Statement about the use of the passive voice in some
context presupposes assumptions about possible effects of the use of this linguistic
construction. Now it is very useful to be aware of the logical structure of the
Situation äs depicted in figure 2, when one tries to formulate such evaluations for
Dutch, because it naturally makes one wonder whether the assumptions made about
the properties of passive constructions are valid; that is, being aware that one must
make certain assumptions is a necessary condition for being critical towards these
assumptions. As it turns out, this critical attitude is useful for Dutch, because it is
important to distinguish clearly between passive sentences with the auxiliary verb
worden ('to become', usually considered the form for the simple present and simple
past of passives), and passive sentences with the auxiliary verb zijn ('to be', usually
considered the form for the present and past perfect of passives).5 It is only the
former type that systematically evokes the idea of a backgrounded agent; for that
reason this type may give rise to specific problems of composition far sooner than
other types of passives. Consequently, an advice on the use of 'passive' will have
to be different, in the same kind of context, for English and for Dutch.6 This
illustrates that evaluative Statements are co-dependent on insights in the properties
of linguistic formulations äs such.
At this point, we may already draw one interesting conclusion for research. Since
ideas about properties of relevant linguistic features are necessarily presupposed in
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evaluative Statements, it is useful to contmuously make these properties the object
of mvestigation, if only in order to avoid the pitfall of implicitly adoptmg naive,
unwarranted assumptions that may be part of the folk view of language in our
culture — or for that matter, perhaps more generally accepted but equally
unwarranted and useless assumptions from any school of hnguistics
In fact, this idea of contmuous cntical mvestigation allows us to take the
general argument a Step further The purpose of mvestigation is not so much
producmg evaluative Statements of type (1) (If function X is mtended choose
formulation Y), but rather exphcatmg what makes such Statements work, i e
justifying them Domg so presupposes that one knows about the properties of Υ
making it suitable to be used m case function X is mtended Now this means that
one necessanly abandons the context C where function X is at stake Any
justification of (1) will take the form of somethmg hke (2)
(2) for Υ has the effect of so-and-so
This would be vacuous if its vahdity was limited to context C of which function
Υ is an aspect Imagine an advice of the followmg kmd
(3) If the persons to be mformed on the use of certam Company buildmgs dunng the penod of
reconstruction are the users of these buildmgs, then use sentences with second person
pronoun subjects (that is, say "You may reach the parkmg lot via the back entrance" rather
than, e g , "The parkmg lot may be reached via the back entrance")
Now imagme someone confronted with this advice and asking "Why9", and the
answer bemg somethmg hke
(4) Well, when you want to mform the users about the accessibility of the parkmg lot dunng the
reconstruction penod, second person address works better than, for example, a passive
construction
This person now would have every reason to protest Such an answer is just not a
justification, but at best a reformulation of the advice The answer to the question
"Why?" becomes a justification only if rt mimmally mcludes a generahzation over
context C and other contexts, for example
(5) Well, this particular context C where function Υ is at stake, looks hke other cases m a
number of respects (a, b, c, ), and 't is m that kmd of contexts that second person address
generally works better than other types of formulation
This will still not be an explanatwn, which would at least require fillmg m the
variables in the formulation Precisely because of its schematic nature, however, it
does show mcely that generahzation is a general property of justification
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All in all, we have now reached the following position: not only are insights into
properties of any formulation Υ required for evaluation, these properties also have
to be stated wdependently from the function X to which Υ may be related in a
specific context C; such a Statement thus necessarily involves constancy over
contexts.
2.2 In interpreting language
Evaluation and advice, äs meta-linguistic activities, may seem to be rather different
from ordinary language use, but this difference in levels actually does not have
many consequences, I believe, for the view of the relation between language and
context. That is to say, recognizing the necessity of generalizing over contexts is
little more than recognizing a fundamental feature of language use itself. If we
recognize a particular event äs the production of a linguistic element, say of the
word 'donkey', we thereby acknowledge certain similarities between the present
Situation of use and previous experiences in which this element was used; i.e.
something justifying the use of 'donkey' now, is that some aspect of the present
Situation looks sufficiently like other situations where 'donkey' was justifiably
used.7 If we could not make that kind of connection, we simply would not be
recognizing whatever was being said or written, äs an instance of the word
'donkey'.
Notice that this in fact formulates a minimal condition of intelligibility: to
understand something must involve acknowledging some similarities between the
present usage event and previous ones. To the extent that we do not succeed in
making this kind of link for (part of) an utterance, we have not understood it - for
this is just what 'understanding' means. So it seems that processes of evaluation or
advice and those of understanding have an important common characteristic: they
presuppose some kind of generalization over contexts, and thus independence of a
particular context, äs a feature of linguistic elements. Similarities between distinct
usage situations (the present one, and previous ones) function crucially in both
evaluation and understanding of language.
Now this seems to conflict with the everyday experience we started out with:
our inability to explain the meaning of a word without reference to some context
(cf. the Lyons-quotation). It is therefore useful to elaborate a bit more on this point
before returning to the main line of the argument.
One major area where linguistic meaning does not, at first sight, seem to be
context-independent, is that of metaphor. Still, it is precisely generalization over
different contexts that underlies its pervasiveness. Unlike what the layman8 may
think, a metaphor is not the use of a linguistic expression in another than its 'literal'
meaning; even though there may be some cases where this description might make
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sense, it cannot be defmitional. This has been known for a long time, but for the
present argument it is highly relevant to elucidate the point once more
In Acket & Stutterheim (1960), a high school textbook on styhstics
unfortunately out of pnnt smce then, Stutterheim relates the story of a man
receivmg a parking ticket, who, m his frustration, calls the officer a donkey As a
result, the man has to face charges, and is sentenced to pay a fine for insultmg an
officer on duty. He teils the judge he regrets his behavior, but he also asks for a
clarification.
Man 'Your honor, if I understood correctly, I'm not allowed to ever say "donkey" to an
officer'''
Judge 'That's what I've tned to make clear, man '
Man 'But I suppose I may say "officer" to a donkey9'
Judge Ί see no legal objections to that, of course '
Man (mumbling, but loud enough for everybody to hear) 'Hm, so I am allowed to say
"officer" to a donkey '
He then walked over to the upholder of justice, and said, with a lot of fnendly emphasis
'Goodbye, officer' - causmg Homenc laughter m which the addressee was the only one not
to participate
(Based on Acket & Stutterheim 1960-81 )
As Stutterheim points out, this demonstrates that in calling the officer "donkey", the
man had not said one thing ("donkey") and meant another ("stupid person"); on the
contrary, for him the officer really was a donkey. In modern terms, he simply
"categorized" the referent äs a donkey. That not all features that may possibly
justify the use ofthat word in other contexts were actually present in this one, does
not in itself make the use of that word more special than another one.
In another way, Lakoff & Johnson (1980:5) make the same point when they
say that in many cases other ('literal') ways to talk about certain topics do not even
exist, so that all one can say is that, for example, the metaphoncal way of talking
about arguments (like 'winning' or 'losing' them) is also the literal way. Similarly,
Rumelhart (1979) and Bolinger (1980, eh. 12) have pointed out that the processes
of producing and understanding metaphors are indistinguishable from the processes
of language use per se: we continuously compare new experiences to old ones -
be it in order to arrive at the most appropriate way of labelling them (in the case
of production), or at the most appropriate Interpretation (upon encountering a word
used and having to Interpret it, i.e. aligning it with previous instances). The point
of metaphor is not a point of language used in some special, deviant way, but of
conceptual mapping: knowledge of one domain is used to (partially) structure
another conceptual domain, creating certain inferences and blocking other ones.
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The conclusion must be that metaphors, like other instances of language in use, are
interpreted in the way they are, precisely because they are taken to embody
gener-alizations over contexts.
3 The necessity of context-sensitivity
3.1 In evaluation
Returning to the main line now, we may state that if we want to evaluate an
instance of an expression on some particular occasion, we should have some idea
of its meaning, independently of that specific context. But this does not mean that
the construction of such an idea is completely unconstrained by considerations of
context, including considerations concerning the actors' specific purposes in the
communicative Situation. This may seem another paradox, so let us quickly try to
resolve it. The idea is simply that some kinds of meaning formulations are more
suitable for purposes of evaluation than others. For example, truth-conditional
semantics in itself does not have an easily discernible relationship with
communicative purposes, i.e. the things that are important measures of adequacy of
expression. The reason is not that truth-conditional semantics is, in some absolute
sense, wrong, but rather that 'truth', the central concept of correspondence to (a
model of) reality, never exhausts the relevance of an utterance. At any time, the
number of propositions true for a Situation is infinite, so being true can never
justify the selection of any one proposition in particular. One could, of course,
conclude that this only goes to show that pragmatics is really independent of
semantics (and vice versa), but I consider it too basic a point that language is used
by people for communication, to think that this would have no effect on its
structural properties; I will not try to argue that position here, but simply assume
it.9 Consequently, Statements about the conditions for the truth of an utterance will
at best have a distant connection with Statements about its adequacy and relevance
äs an Instrument of communication. So for evaluation purposes not all approaches
to meaning are equally useful; taking meaning to consist in, essentially,
correspondence to the world may provide some criterion for evaluation (say in
applying Grice's first Maxim of Quality) but is at best very limited.10
Something similar holds for certain kinds of psycho-linguistics, in my view. I have
in mind approaches that attribute some context-independent degree of complexity
to expressions, measured, for example, äs the number of words per sentence,
etcetera. The idea is that expressions with a high score are more difficult to parse
than other ones with lower scores, so that some expressions only allow for (easy)
processing by people with high education, whereas more simple expressions could
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be (easily) parsed by everybody (for a recent critical survey, see Jansen 1995). Note
that such an approach in principle allows for some evaluative Statements. An
example could be the idea that a passive construction is complex, and therefore
harder to process than the corresponding sentence in the active voice. This is the
type of applied or normative linguistics which Maureau (1983) describes äs its
initial stage, but which is certainly not dead (äs an example, see Petric 1992). Its
general character can be depicted in figure 3.
Figure 3
Recall that we set up figure 2 in response to the idea that consideration of
contextual functions could lead to evaluative Statements independently of a semantic
analysis of the linguistic elements involved. Approaches of the type depicted in
figure 3 are in a sense complementary: they embody the idea that consideration of
language independently of context can lead to evaluation.
I want to claim that this type of approach is equally wrong, though for different
reasons. The problem discussed in section 2.1 concerned the logic of the
argumentation: I tried to show that evaluation necessarily presupposes ideas about
meanings generalizing over contexts. Here the problem seems to be a
misunderstanding of the nature of linguistic comtnunication. The point is that it
seems silly for a language to have both complex and simple ways of doing things
if the former do not have an advantage in certain contexts — at least one feature
that, if one wanted to communicate it and one did not have linguistic resources to
do the Job, would require a whole lot of energy and trouble to get across. The
alleged complex formulation therefore is, in that context, actually the simplest thing
to do, especially if it is reasonable to expect the addressee to know the expression
in question. In short, in view of the communicative function of language, the whole
notion of some expressions being inherently more complex than others is
suspect." Abstractly, the idea is that an utterance is never really processed (and
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thus should never be evaluated) in vacuo, but always with respect to some context.
Even in terms of processing efforts, the point is that the adequacy of using a
particular linguistic construction should be evaluated in terms of the net sum so to
speak, of the effort of processing the linguistic and the contextual Information
together. I will come back to this issue in section 4.
For now, the consequence of this view amounts to a requirement on the
formulation of meanings, which are, äs I said, themselves context-independent. The
requirement is, simply, that these formulations should allow for a useful
combination with descriptions of communicative contexts, in order to contribute to
an evaluation of linguistic communication. Just äs the formulation of functions must
be constrained by the set of linguistic expressions available in a language, the
formulation of meanings must be constrained by the demand that they be sensitive
to context features, in order to allow for evaluation in an indefinitely varying set
of contexts.
So meanings are not only generalizations over contexts (section 2); in order to be
really useful in evaluative or advisory practices, they also have to be formulated in
such a way that they allow for adaptation to context. I will now try to illustrate
both points by means of an example mentioned before: the passive construction (in
Dutch).
Cornelis (1997) makes an interesting point concerning the use of passive
constructions in two newspaper articles on Ajax winning the national league in
Holland in 1994. One article is from Het Parool, an Amsterdam newspaper, another
is from NRC-Handelsblad, a national paper (office in Rotterdam). In some respects,
passives are used similarly in both articles; typically, individual human agents take
precedence äs subjects, especially in active sentences. However, in one area there
is a significant difference. Whereas Ajax äs an agent has about the same frequency
in both articles, it never is an agent in a passive in Het Parool, while it does occur
in this role in NRC. As Cornelis points out, this is quite understandable given the
distinct attitudes of the newspapers with respect to Ajax: Het Parool naturally
identifies much more with Ajax than NRC. Furthermore, this difference corresponds
with other characteristics of the texts (headlines äs well äs contents): NRC has a
much more cynical view on the way Ajax became champion than Het Parool has.
In such a line of thought, the relevant property of the passive construction is
that it is an Operation on the relation between the producer of the utterance on the
one hand and the agent in the event being described on the other: äs a reader one
understands that the writer does not see the agent quite like s/he would see her/
himself in such an event (see Cornelis 1995, 1997, for theoretical elaboration). This
formulation of the meaning of the passive makes it possible to have the concrete
effect of the use of the construction being co-dependent on the context. In fact, it
even makes it i'mpossible to produce an evaluation of its use independently of a
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specific context of use the possibihty of evaluation only anses if we know at least
who are communicatmg and about what For example, if Het Parool would have
had Ajax m the role of a passive agent, we could have feit justified m advismg the
author to change these sentences, but m the NRC context, that advice would be out
of order
At the same time, it should be noted that the formulation of the function of the
passive ;tee//"generalizes over such contexts Charactenstics of the context, though
always co-determmants of the effects of the use of language, do not enter mto this
formulation Formulatmg the function of the passive precisely means statmg a way,
or a number of related ways, to connect the different contexts m which its use may
be considered justified
As an aside, note that for a language user to be able to draw practical consequences
from an analysis, it may sometimes be sufficient to formulate the function of the
passive context-mdependently, for example äs "It decreases the degree by which the
producer of the utterance identifies with the agent", leavmg the apphcation m
particular cases to the user An evaluator or adviser sometimes does not have to
spell out types of contexts or consequences explicitly, in order to enable users to
use a semantic/pragmatic analysis In a sense, this is fortunate m view of the fact
that the number of possible contexts is, of course, infinite It is often useful for
purposes of instruction to lay out a number of different types of contexts, and to
explore the details of the effects of a Imguistic expression in those contexts, but this
can never lead to a. procedure for evaluation Nor is such a procedure necessary, äs
members of the culture, users may agree on relevant context features without a
procedure for fixing them As generahzations over contexts, meanings are a kmd
of schematized rules for usmg words and constructions, and are äs such often
sufficient for apphcation in specific situations
Complementary, there may also be situations where it is not necessary to spell
out the meaning of the passive, but rather some features of the context, the function
that commumcation is to fulfil and the like, in order to reach agreement on the
appropnateness of the construction In any case, such practical differences should
not obscure that when we, äs analysts, try to widerstand what constitutes this
appropnateness, both features of language and features of context are necessanly
taken mto account, and are m fact integrated
3.2 In interpretmg language
In discussing the necessity of context-mdependence I claimed that the process of
evaluation is, in this respect, actually similar to that of Interpretation Recogmzing
some activity äs an instance of language use mvolves recognizing similanties
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between the present context and
question now arises whether the
processes of language production
to context too? In other words:
useful for descriptive purposes äs
defmitely be positive. Let me try
relevant cases, the use of passive
other ones äs much äs evaluation does. So the
same parallel holds for context-sensitivity. Do
and Interpretation themselves involve adjustment
are context-sensitive formulatio-is of meanings
well? Not surprisingly, I think the answer should
to make the point by means of cliscussing some
constructions once again, and fmally metaphors.
The usefulness of a context-sensitive view of the function of the passive is clearly
demonstrated by some observations on the distribution of passives. A telling
example is that of the Queen's Speeches at the openings of the Dutch parliamentary
year over the last decade (Van der Veer 1994). A non-context-sensitive account, for
example one that considers the passive a feature of formal style, would seem to
predict that passives are randomly distributed over the text; after all, it is formal
from beginning to end. Actually, the distribution turns out to be heavily skewed.
When one distinguishes, on independent grounds of content, between clauses
announcing policy measures and clauses describing events in reality (naturally äs
the government sees them), passives are really far more frequent in the former than
in the latter. From the functional point of view formulated before, this comes äs no
surprise: most, if not all policy measures are going to have a negative effect on at
least pari of the population, so it is only natural that there is a tendency not to
present the agent in these text segments äs an entity to identify with. A look at
some details confirms the idea that the government actually has no general problem
depicting itself äs fully responsible for its actions (i.e. in subject position in
transitive clauses): it happens regularly in parts where the government clearly
expects its actions to be applauded rather than denounced. The observed correlation
with formality thus receives a functional explanation: announcing policy measures
is done in a formal type of discourse, but the former is the real explanatory factor.
The necessity of assuming context-sensitivity of meanings can also be demcnstrated
in the domain of metaphor, i.e. the same area of phenomena that I used in section
3.2 to illustrate the context-independent constancy of meaning; there I argued that
metaphors precisely illustrate that point because the mapping from one domain to
another has to preserve conceived structure from the 'source domain' in order for
the metaphor to structure the Contents of the 'target domain'. But the actual
selection of what is preserved and what may be discarded in a metaphorical
mapping, is not constrained (beyond convention), and thus highly sensitive to
context.12 Let me illustrate this point with one of the most pervasive metaphors
in different types of (non-literary) texts: personification.
One common metaphor in Western culture is A STATE IS A PERSON (Chilton &
Lakoff 1989; Lakoff 1991; for Dutch: Lammerts & Verhagen 1994). The metaphor
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has a number of entaüments with important consequences for foreign policy (the
most general one perhaps being the assumption that a state is a behavioral and
intentional unity, its actions being the result of its intentions, and not of, say,
internal conflicts). One such entailment is that states may be in different life-stages:
some are children, in need of guidance, education, and correction, while others may
be considered mature, and thus natural candidates for leadership in the Community
of state/persons. The 'usefulness' of this piece of mapping from a source to a target
domain lies, of course, in the understanding, and sometimes the justification, that
it provides for a number of international relations, for instance those between
developing and developed countries.
Now not all aspects of the life-stage-entailment are necessarily mapped onto
the target domain; while there are no structural reasons for their absence, old-age
and death are not 'activated', at least not in Western countries, äs features of the
personification of states when, for example, the relationship between Western and
Third-World countries is the target domain. The reason that this does not happen
seems evident: it is these Western countries that would be implied to be closer to
old-age and death, with all obviously undesirable consequences for their Claims to
power and leadership.13
That the absence of this mapping is not due to a structural constraint is
manifest from a Situation where a structurally similar (but non-conventional)
metaphor does involve this mapping. The former Dutch Minister Mr. Winsemius,
once described government policies äs having a life like a person (de Jong 1995):
they statt out äs the children of their initial designers (usually government officials),
then mature and become independent from these initial designers, and finally, when
the goals have been reached, they have to die. Here the whole point of the
personification, the way the metaphor structures the target domain, makes no sense
if it would not include the final stage of life.
In fact, the notion of a life cycle itself does not have to take part in
personification at all. Computer manuals, for example, sometimes personify the
machine or the program (with expressions of the type Program X thus frees you
from having to perform task 7, or: The Computer then asks \vhether you want to
continue), but in those contexts the idea of a life-like development makes no sense
(in others, of course, it may be more suitable).
So what we see is that knowledge of the source (of the concepts "person" and
"life") is preserved in metaphorical use, but there is no way of saying, in advance
of the metaphor, which aspects of this knowledge will actually get mapped and
which not. Important for the purpose of my present argument is that the meaning
of 'source-domain-elements' must be sufficiently structured to allow for the
activation (or, äs Reichling (1967:325) called it: "actuation") of different features
on different occasions.
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Το return to the main line once again: both in evaluating and in describing language
use, it seems inevitable to conceive of meanings in such a way that they have no
particular way of application built into them, but rather have something like Open
places' to be füled in by Information from other sources, or constitute some
structured complex from which aspects may be discarded depending on such Other
Information'. First, it turns out that context-sensitivity is a feature of evaluation and
description alike, just like context-independence (cf. section 2). Second, it should
be noted that this way of conceiving of meanings makes it impossible to think of
them äs 'building blocks' of Interpretation. This metaphor must be abandoned in
favor of the idea that meanings are Instruments for Interpretation, or more
technically: the context-independent meanings of linguistic units are constraints on
interpretations. A meaning is not apart of an Interpretation, but rather specifies a
(set of) condition(s) that an optimal Interpretation should meet.
This view of meaning also opens a possibility for reconsidering the relation
between meaning and context. From the point of view of a cognitive System, a
feature of the context is just another constraint on Interpretation. In that sense,
context is not altogether different from linguistic meaning. Now this entails a
certain view on the nature of a cognitive System äs (at least to an important extent)
a constraint satisfaction System, and it therefore seems appropriate to explore some
important aspects of such a view. This is what I will turn to now. I will try to argue
that such a view has both a certain plausibility and some interesting consequences
precisely for the relation between meaning and context.
4 Parallel processing and the equivalence
of linguistic and non-linguistic context
Recall the analysis of the passive construction mentioned in section 3.2. It was
claimed that the use of this construction entailed that the speaker/writer does not
view the agent quite like him/herself. It is easy to see that on this view, the way a
passive construction is processed is always coordinated with processing (other)
features of the environment. Consequently, there never is a moment in the process
such that what someone understands could be specified in no other terms than the
general, constant function of the passive. Rather, this view suggests processing of
all kinds of Information (linguistic and otherwise) in parallel, constraining the
construction of an Interpretation. The idea of parallel processing has recently been
developed in a computational approach to modelling cognition called
"connectionism", or "parallel distributed processing" (FDP), and I would like to use
some central concepts from this approach äs a model for the analysis of language-
as-it-is-actually-used that takes its complexity into account without becofning too
complex itself.14
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Connectiomst models have been developed, at least partly, in response to Standard
models that use the senal digital Computer äs a metaphor for human cognition
Undoubtedly, human cognitive behavior is very complex, and the Standard way of
modelling it has been to assume different modules of computation, each performing
a specific Operation on its mput in order to produce an Output which is then further
processed by another module The complex overall task is thus spht up into a
number of relatively simple parts This approach has been successful in a number
of respects, but is not without problems, especially äs far äs reahstic modelling of
processing is concerned For certam analytical purposes, there need be no doubt
about the usefulness of distmctions between Information based on, for example,
hnguistic evidence on the one hand, and non-lmguistic evidence on the other, but
projecting such analytical distmctions äs mput-output modules onto the human mind
is not justified on the basis of such usefulness only, and also probably wrong in
view of elementary limitations (esp speed) of smgle processing units in mdividual
brains IS
The connectiomst approach, m contrast, assumes parallel processing of inputs
by massive numbers of simple units that spread activation through a network äs
they are mterconnected (with different and variable degrees of strengths, or
"weights", and with inhibitmg äs well äs excitatory connections) The output
produced by such a System is not represented in any way within the system (no
internal Symbols), but is determmed by the entire (distnbuted) pattern of activation
of the units connected to the output unit Langacker summanzes the properties of
the resultmg Systems in the followmg way
First, [ ] FDP models have important analog properties, m that both conneotion weights and
levels of activation can vary over a contmuous ränge of values Second, there is no central
processing unit, and no program tellmg the system what to do Each unit autonomousiy
performs a stnctly local computation it sums its inputs to determme its own level of
activation, and hence the degree of activation it passes on to other units (depending on
connection weights and whether the connections are excitatory or mhibitory) Third, a
computation does not proceed senally, one Operation at a time, but instead shows massive
parallehsm, äs all units simultaneously perform their local computations m mutually
mteractive fashion Fourth, the system's memory resides m connection weights, which are
the only things modified by traimng Memory is therefore distributed rather than local, smce
an item of memory is not mherent in any smgle weight, but m a configuration of weights that
collectively give rise to a particular computational result [ ] Fmally, no distmction is drawn
between rules and representations, for there are no exphcit rules at al l—the system merely
learns to respond m certam ways to particular kinds of mput Rather than being distinct and
mdependent entities, the generahzations it extracts are imphcit in the similarity of its
responses to similar mput patterns (Langacker 1991 527)
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Connectionist models are particularly suited to model situations involving so-called
soft constraints: a 'rule' that makes a particular Interpretation more likely, given a
certain kind of evidence, but that may be violated, or better: that simply will have
no effect, when enough other such rules (each of them in itself equally 'soft')
suggest another Interpretation. For example, given a distribution of connection
weights that represents the constraints among interpretations for each of the corners
of a Necker cube, a connectionist net will easily settle for one of the two coherent
interpretations of such a cube, even if some of its input units provide contradictory
evidence. Note that an activated input unit (detecting the presence of some
perceptual feature) only provides one of the constraints, which has no qualitatively
different Status äs compared to other constraints.
It is this conception of constraint satisfaction, äs a way a cognitive System operates
with evidence from its environment, that I think is particularly useful for a further
clarification of notions of meaning and context, and their interrelatedness.
Interpretation of a linguistic usage event is in actual practice Interpretation of the
entire event, and not just the linguistic forms used. We take the words and
constructions used, and other perceived aspects of the Situation, äs soft constraints
on the representation we are to build of the entire Situation. In other words, we try
to reach a new cognitive state which is optimal in the sense that the degree of
satisfaction of the totality of constraints is maximal. This may entail that some
constraints, although present, do not contribute to the new cognitive state at all: if
the actual maximum of constraint satisfaction is such that some constraints do not
contribute to it, or perhaps even have a negative contribution, the corresponding
cognitive state will still become the new one — without the System having to decide
to 'cancel' the contribution of these constraints. Take the simplified picture in
figure 4 äs an Illustration.
Left a number of units is listed, including the degree to which they constrain some
Interpretation A; activation of a unit provides either a positive indication for
Interpretation A, or a negative one, äs indicated by the plus- and minus-signs; the
strengths of the connections are indicated by the numbers, representing the amount
with which the activation of the unit is to be multiplied upon being passed on, äs
well äs a sign indicating excitation (+) or Inhibition (—).1 6 For the sake of
presentation, the threshold value for A is assumed to be 1.5 (if the activation level
of this unit is lower man 1.5, it does not 'turn on'; if the level reaches 1.5 or
higher, it does turn on). Each unit passes some activation (determined by the
weighted sum of the activations passed on to it from, ultimately, 'perception units',
via connections of different strengths) on to the Output. Suppose that the activation
put out by each of the units l and 2 is l, while that of 3 is 0.2, and no other units
connected to A are activated. The total activation passed on to A then is







(0.5*!)+(! .5* 1)-(2.0*0.2) = 0.5+1.5 -0.4 = 1.6 which exceeds the threshold value,
and so A will turn on: the System displays Interpretation A and seems to favor
constraints l and 2, while discarding constraint 3 even though there is evidence for
it in the input - but without any Operation' that specifically cancels the effect of
constraint 3.
Now consider the same configuration, but with unit n passing on an activation
of 1. Then ihe total activation into^ is 0.5+1.5—0.4—0.5=1.1, which is below the
threshold value of 1.5, so that A will not turn on; now the System seems to discard
constraints l and 2 even though there is evidence for them — again without any
Operation on those constraints. I leave it to the reader to see for himself how some
juggling with different levels of activation can produce many different patterns
leading to an Interpretation either turning on or not, and that all patterns leading to
the same end-state need not have a particular activated unit in common (i.e., an
Interpretation need not have 'essentiaP features).
It should be emphasized that this is a gross simplification of what is going on in
connectionist networks;17 it nevertheless suffices to serve äs a useful model for
clarifying some of the complicated issues in the analysis of actual language usage.
That is to say, I will explore the consequences of the idea that the meanings of
linguistic elements may indeed be viewed äs constraints on interpretations, i.e. äs
activation (triggered by the perception of a linguistic element in the input) being
passed on, in an inhibitory or excitatory way, to one or more possible
interpretations. I will highlight three aspects that seem to me to be of particular
interest for our conception of meaning and context.
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4.1 Identity of constraints
The first implication of this approach that I would like to bring to the fore is that
the character of the constraints themselves does not change under different
interpretations — not even if their contribution to an Interpretation is negative. A
concrete example illustrating this is the following: the meaning of "red" äs a traffic
light (the constraint connecting unit l to a decision on how to proceed) does not
change when in a specific case I decide to drive on because the sum of all available
input (constraints 2—n) has led me to the conclusion that the operating system is
malfunctioning; the red sign does not loose its meaning äs a constraint against
driving on, not even in this specific case.18 This sheds a new light on the Status
of one type of Statement that gave rise to this discussion (see section 1): "X means
something different in context A man in context B". Such a formulation suggests
that the nature of X does change because of the context. We may now hypothesize
that this kind of Statement may have been inevitable, and therefore still appears
somewhat natural, because our conception of meanings entering interpretations (the
former somehow being part of the latter) simply made it necessary. I.e., it may have
been the result of the naive idea that the meanings of elements are actually the
building blocks of interpretations, things being passed on by a 'sender' through
some 'channe!' to a 'receiver' who supposedly constructs an Interpretation by
assembling them - i.e. the powerful but erroneous metaphor for linguistic
communication that has been baptized the "conduit-metaphor" by Reddy (1979; see
also Langacker 1987:452ff, 1991:508).
A very illuminating example, both for the usefulness of the constraint
satisfaction model and for the sloppiness of naive use of the term "meaning", is
provided by Hutchins (1995). Hutchins considers navigation on navy vessels. This
involves regularly "taking the bearings" of three landmarks (determining their
direction with respect to the ship) in order to determine ("fix") the position of the
vessel. Ideally, the three bearings should be taken simultaneously, but when less
than three persons are on this Job, this is of course impossible. The optimal order
(introducing the minimal amount of error) is then to first take the bearing(s) of the
landmark(s) that is (are) to the side of the ship (so-called beam-bearings): those are
the ones whose angular speed with respect to the ship is changing fastest, while the
orientation of a landmark that is more or less ahead will hardly change in the time
necessary to take the first (two) bearings. Taken in that order, the actual bearings
will most closely resemble the 'ideal' Situation of being taken simultaneously. This
procedure is summarized in the "rule of thumb": "Take the beam bearing first"
(Hutchins 1995:206).
As Hutchins points out, the application of this rule is straightforward with one
person on the Job, but not so in a Situation with two observers (and this is the usual
Situation: one observer on port side and the other on starboard side). Taking the
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three bearings then becomes distributed (one observer taking one bearing, the other
one taking two). This introduces indeterminacy äs to the identity of "the beam
bearing":
When the rule is mvoked [ ] by a single quartermaster standmg watch alone, the beam
bearing refers to the bearing in the set of three that is nearest the beam of the ship, and the
sequence specifier "first" is established with respect to the entire set of three bearings
(Hutchms 1995 217)
That is, the constraints present in the Situation include the linguistic elements beam
and first, and also knowledge of the set of three bearings to choose from.
In the group Version of the task, a pelorus operator [observer on the wing of a ship —AV]
cannot always determme whether any bearing he has been assigned is nearer the beam than
any bearing assigned to the other pelorus operator [ ] It is äs though other words were
missing from the simple Statement of the rule A more explicit version of the rule in the solo
watchstandmg case would be "Ofthe set of three bearings, shoot the beam bearing first" It
is not necessary to say these words m the solo watchstandmg context, because the entire set
of three bearings is the watchstander's responsibility Their presence in that context is not
needed [ ] (id)
In the group version, each of the observers lacks some evidence (input) that, in
conjunction with the rule of thumb, provided the solo watchstander with sufficient
constraints to establish a unique Interpretation. In the absence of such input, the
same rule turns out not to provide a sufficient constraint (on its own) to determine
such an Interpretation.19 So here we have a nice example how a number of
different (positive) constraints turn out to determine a particular kind of
Interpretation. As long äs the second type of Situation has not occurred, the
relevance of the 'contextual' constraints might escape our attention, so that we
might be under the Illusion that the Interpretation is entirely determined by nothing
eise than the meanings of the expressions involved.
Interestingly, it seems äs if Hutchins himself is somehow still caught in this
belief, because the sentence I left out of the middle of the last quotation reads äs
follows:
A pelorus operator stationed on one wing of the ship cannot give either of these words the
meanmg it has for the solo watchstander. (id.)
And on the next page it say s:
The pelorus operators need a meanmg of 'beatmest' that they can apply on the basis of what
they can see, and they cannot see all three bearings at once Transportmg knowledge from
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the solo performance context is very problematic. It may require changes in the meanings of
words.
In my view, the entire description äs Hutchins presents it rather invites the
conclusion that "first" just means what it means, and that this is precisely the reason
why it does not suffice in a Situation that does not provide the Interpreter access to
the entire relevant set. But his own formulation creates the Impression äs if the
context enables the solo watchstander to give some specific meaning to the words,
rather than to Interpret the entire Situation coherently and in a unique way.
Similarly, I would not say that the change in the task Situation requires changes in
the meanings, but rather, äs his own formulation suggests, the addition of some
more linguistic input, in the absence of certain specific non-linguistic constraints.
Note also that it is at best misleading to suggest that the non-linguistic contexts
"disambiguates" the meanings of the words, or anything of that kind. This would
seem to imply a two-stage process (having the linguistic Information changed,
before it is applied to the world), whereas a one-stage process (parallel application
of constraints to form an Interpretation of the world) is simply sufficient. But it
looks äs if the folk model of conceptualizing communication äs 'unpacking what
is in the words' is so pervasive that it is hard to formulate a description that avoids
invoking this model. We have the Illusion, on the basis of some Standard set of
situations, that what is communicated is only in the words, and when we then
encounter a Situation in which the same words are used, but something eise (or
nothing) is communicated, we sometimes still do not see through the illusion, and
then describe this Situation äs if the words have a different meaning due to the
different context.
But we have already seen that upon elaboration this view is untenable:
meanings must be conceived of äs somehow constant, generalizing over contexts
(section 2). We can now also see how a view of meanings äs constraints on
interpretations (rather than äs parts of them) allows for a more consistent picture.
If interpretations arise from patterns of distributed Information, the relation of a
linguistic element to an Interpretation may be very different on various occasions,
but without the element äs such changing its character from one occasion to
another: it just provides positive or negative activation for the interpretations it is
connected to, and it does so constantly. But since the total activation of an
Interpretation is always determined by several inputs, with different weights and
directionalities, there is no unique way in which the constraint will show up in all
its uses. For example, there is no way of knowing in advance of an Interpretation
(so without having considered the entire pattern of activation) whether a constraint
is going to support or contradict it, äs the discussion of even the simple case of
figure 4 has demonstrated. But in all conceivable cases, it remains true that when
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certain conditions in the environment hold, a constraint leads to passing on some
specific degree of activation.
Note that it is indeed not only meanings that can be usefiilly conceived of äs
constraints on Interpretation. Features of the context function in the same way. In
the preceding paragraphs, we appear to have encountered different 'kinds' of
context: position in an utterance, domains in the case of metaphorical mappings,
wider cultural knowledge, the identity of the communicative participants, etcetera.
What these aspects have in common is that they all function äs constraints on the
Interpretation of the relevant usage events; in that sense, context is the set of
relevant non-linguistic constraints on the Interpretation of linguistic usage events.
But note that from the point of view of constraint satisfaction äs such, these
constraints do not necessarily differ in nature: they are just constraints on
interpretations. Put differently: a piece of Information about a usage event,
constraining its Interpretation, may be obtained from linguistic input in one case,
and from non-linguistic input in another - that does not necessarily lead to
different interpretations. In the next section, I will explore the consequences of this
idea.
4.2 Language äs context
Consider figure 4 once again. In the discussion so far I interpreted some constraints
äs being of a linguistic nature, and others äs non-linguistic (contextual). However,
nothing in the constraint satisfaction model äs such imposes such an Interpretation.
For a processing System, it may actually make no difference, when unit l represents
a linguistic element perceived in the Situation, whether unit 2 represents a non-
linguistic feature, or a linguistic one. With respect to the linguistic constraint
represented in unit l, unit 2 just provides 'context'.
The first thing to note is that this makes us aware on the relational nature of
the notion of "context". Notice that we are actually taking a meta-linguistic point
of view when we call something "context". We usually ask for the contexts of
words or expressions (compare the quote from Lyons at the beginning), but not for
the words or expressions in some context, or, for that matter, for the linguistic
context of certain visual Stimuli. But for a System that is just processing constraints
associated with features perceived in the environment ("Information"), this
difference does not exist äs such; rather, there are just these different features of the
environment (some of which may be linguistic) on the basis of which an
Interpretation is constructed. At a certain point, we focus on one particular piece of
Information that is presently considered to be worth specific attention; once it has
been focused on, the rest becomes its context, but not sooner.
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So the notion of "context" is a meta-notion, not necessarily corresponding to a
distinction relevant in the same way at the object-level. Again, for an Interpreter in
the world, there is no reason to systematically give primacy to some types of
Information over others; all there is are constraints on Interpretation, some
strengthening each other's effects, and others competing. Sometimes linguistic
information ("the text") will be used to help fill in some details of a representation,
the main lines of which have already been established on the basis of other data,
sometimes the Situation will be the other way round; it is clear that there will be
no sharp boundary between these two ways of balancing linguistic and non-
linguistic information. All in all, this is another instance where we have to take care
not to project our way of conceptualizing things in an analysis, useful or even
necessary äs it may be, onto the Situation analyzed.
The second consequence is that the information providing the context for some
piece of linguistic information may very well be linguistic itself without it making
any essential difference. In other words, there is no reason whatsoever to make a
categorial distinction between interpreting utterance A in a Situation in which
features X and Υ are perceived, and interpreting A in a text somehow evoking X
and Y. Again, in the picture of figure 4, there is just a set of constraints. The
cognitive task of constraint satisfaction does not alter essentially if some of the
constraints are non-linguistic and others linguistic, or if all constraints are linguistic.
Thus there seems to be no basis for attempts that try to distinguish autonomous
from non-autonomous linguistics in terms of the former 'taking extra-linguistic
factors into account', simply because it is not clear, from the point of view of a
parallel processing System, that 'non-linguistic information' and Other linguistic
Information' differ systematically in their causal cognitive properties.20
The reason why I emphasize the last point is that it shows why, in an interpretive
practice, all material on which Interpretation is based may legitimately consist of
text. Interpreting a piece of discourse with respect to other non-linguistic constraints
is not essentially different from interpreting it with respect to other linguistic ones.
And why should it? After all, what all pieces of information have in common is
that they only give rise.to constraints \vithin a cognitive system. Why should there
be any deep difference between, on the one hand, Hutchins's solo watchstander
from the previous section, constructing an Interpretation on the basis of the
linguistic information "Take the beam bearing first" and the non-linguistic
knowledge that there are exactly three bearings to take, and on the other hand
someone constructing an Interpretation on the basis of two pieces of linguistic
information, viz. "Take the beam bearing first" and "There are exactly three
bearings to take"? We know from psycholinguistic research that the precise
linguistic form of an expression is lost very quickly (it hardly 'survives working
memory'), and that only a far more abstract conceptual representation is preserved.
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The consequence of this fact should not be that we äs analysts no longer have to
pay attention to the details of utterances (they are still causally related to the
conceptual representation!), but that for purposes of Interpretation we should not
make a deep distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic context.
I conclude that we both may and should stop reasoning äs if "context may affect
meaning", or even "context may affect Interpretation". The danger of such
Statements is that they are simple transitive clauses, evoking a model of one entity
directly exerting some force on another, which is thereby changed (cf. Kemmer &
Verhagen (1994), and the references cited there, especially the folk model of
causation in Lakoff (1987); also Solinger (1980:157)). In other words: such
Statements easily suggest that the relation between context and meaning or
Interpretation may be direct, whereas they are actually never linked anywhere but
within a 'cognizer', processing several pieces of Information (some of which are
in his/her own long term memory) in parallel in order to arrive at a coherent
Interpretation that will guide him/her in taking the next step (usually small,
sometimes big) in life. When we use "context", "meaning" and "Interpretation" äs
subject and object in simple clauses, we might just forget that it is people who use
Information from all kinds of sources to construct representations of the
communicative Situation. Even worse, it contains the risk of seeing things that do
not exist, magical immediate connections between features of the context and
features of language. In actual fact, both have to be recognized by a human being
in a Situation. The connectionist approach to cognition provides us with a
conceptual model that allows us to see how a cognitive System may take a number
of different constraints äs input to form one coherent Interpretation, and how it can
use the same constraint to contribute to different interpretations in a consistent and
straightforward way.
4.3 Evaluation, Interpretation and semantic analysis
Finally, I would like to turn to the question of the Status of evaluative and advisory
practices of linguistics advocated at the end of section l, that functioned äs frame
of reference for the rest of the discussion.
In terms of the constraint satisfaction approach, the evaluation of language use
can be seen äs a judgment on three aspects. The first is the issue whether a
constraint invoked by some linguistic feature is consistent with the overall
Interpretation, i.e. whether it contributes positively to the optimum of constraint
satisfaction, or negatively (only the former being a basis for positive evaluation).
The second aspect is that of the relative weight of its contribution, i.e. the portion
of a particular feature in the total level of activation (the higher this portion, the
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'more important' the feature involved is for the Interpretation, and the less easily
it can be left out or replaced). The third aspect is the level of activation itself,
interpreted äs strength of an Interpretation: if the linguistic input does not suffice
to strongly support one particular Interpretation, this fact may be a basis for
negative evaluation.21
Of these three aspects, I will only discuss consistency and level of activation
in greater detail. As far äs I can see, weight will be especially important in
evaluating literary language, perhaps even specifically poetry, where changing one
word may make an immense difference. But most ordinary communication seems
to be characterized by a Situation of several elements 'working in parallel' to
establish an Interpretation.
To Start with level of activation - the strength or weakness of an Interpretation -
I think it may in many cases actually be reduced to the other two aspects, especially
consistency. There are two fundamentally different ways an Interpretation may be
reached with only a rather low level of activation; one is simply insufficient
evidence, the other is contradictory evidence. It will be clear that the latter type
may indeed be reduced to consistency: both inhibitory and excitatory constraints for
one or more interpretations are activated, resulting in indeterminacy. For the former
type — a low level of activation because the evidence seems to be insufficient —
one might think of 'vague' utterances, that just do not say very much, in a context
that is not very specific either. So "Take the beam bearing first" in a Situation
where one cannot know which bearing is the beamiest, might be a case in point.
However, even in cases that look like 'vagueness' there may actually be more
inconsistency than is initially apparent. Consider the knowledge of Hutchins's
observer, in the group version of the bearing taking task, who is to take two
bearings. If he (call him: observer A) knows no more than that, and he receives the
above instruction, there is actually no logical problem for him to arrive at an
Interpretation: of two bearings that do not have exactly the same direction, there can
be no doubt which one is "the beam bearing". The fact that the problem
nevertheless arises in practice, is due to observer A knowing more than that. He
knows that there is another observer B on the other wing of the ship who too is to
take a bearing, but observer A cannot see this third landmark, so he cannot compare
its properties, especially its direction, to those of the landmarks he is to observe
himself. It is only because of the knowledge that an unidentified landmark exists,
that the identifiability constraint invoked by the defmite article "the" does not
determine a unique Interpretation. So it seems that even this Situation is to be
construed äs one of inconsistency: the use of the defmite article is inconsistent with
a Situation with elements in a set about which nothing is known but that they exist.
One might want to argue, in itself correctly, that this Situation is characterized by
lack of evidence, resulting in indeterminacy of Interpretation, and therefore different
Context, meaning and Interpretation, in a practical approach to linguistics 33
from other situations in which there is conflicting evidence, while here we have a
conflict between evidence and knowledge in long term memory; in terms of
constraint satisfaction, however, there need not be an essential difference between
the two (cf. the previous section).
In any case, vagueness and indeterminacy are real phenomena, although
dependent on other relevant knowledge an Interpreter might have. Their evaluation
thus requires the choice of a particular perspective. For example, one has to know
things, or at least make assumptions about the knowledge of the reader of a text in
order to determine whether the presence of phrases like As a solution or Therefore
raises the level of activation of a certain Interpretation beyond the threshold level,
or at least strengthens it noticeably (which would lead to a positive evaluation), or
whether it is just highly redundant (cf. note 21). But it is clear that at least the
analytical part of the work can be described adequately in terms of constraint
satisfaction.
This holds even stronger for the issue of consistency. Recall the example of the use
of passive constructions in two different Dutch newspapers, Het Parool and NRC-
Handelsblad (see pp.18-19). In saying that the use of the passive in NRC is
adequate, we actually claim that it is consistent with other data, other things we
know that are relevant for our Interpretation; in conjunction with other constraints,
the use of the passive contributes positively to the Interpretation. Contrast this with
the following: a local newspaper once reported a match of the town's Volleyball
team with them frequently in the position of the implicit or explicit agent of passive
clauses. This we may call less adequate, precisely because this use is not consistent
with other evidence concerning the relation between the producer of the discourse
and the agent. Here the description of the pattern of activation and its evaluation
are actually closely related activities. As it turns out, it is no coincidence that the
pictures given in figure 2 (of evaluation) and in figure 4 (of Interpretation), exhibit
a highly similar structure: in both cases a number of different inputs jointly gives
rise to a new cognitive state. The only difference is that in the former we classified
the inputs into two types (given the topic of the discussion), while the latter is a
very general Schema that does not contain any classification of inputs.
In fact, I want to take this resemblance one step further. I just described an
important type of evaluation äs an analysis of the degree of consistency between
some linguistic constraint and other (linguistic or non-linguistic) constraints (the
degree to which these all jointly determine a sensible Interpretation) on a specific
occasion. But when we formulate the meaning of a linguistic element, we formulate
a generalization over the interpretations to which it contributes positively, i.e.
features of contexts where the use of this element is consistent.22 After all, this is
how meanings (the constraints with their weights and directions) arise: through the
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observation of repeated uses of an element and the cumulative adaptation of the
connections between input and Interpretation resulting from this repetition, the unit
involved comes to represent a particular feature äs a generalization over a maximum
of these contexts.
Interestingly, the conclusion can therefore be that the processes of evaluation
(and Interpretation), and those of semantic description do not so much differ äs to
their nature, but rather to their purpose and level of application. An evaluation is
a Statement about the consistency of something used on a particular occasion, its
purpose being to make someone see a mistake, to give a judgment, or to effect a
change in usage. A semantic description is a general Statement of the same type,
i.e. a Statement of the kind of interpretations that an element is consistent with, with
purposes such äs justifying particular Statements of the first type, to teach someone
the proper use of the language, and things like that.
5 Conclusion
I have been asking questions and making Claims on the contents of our notions of
'meaning' and 'context', starting from the observation that some seemingly ordinary
Statements involving these notions turn out, on close inspection, to contradict each
other. The background of the discussion was formed by the idea that linguistic
theory should provide Instruments that can be put to use for relevant purposes
outside the domain of linguistics itself. I have tried to systematically approach the
relevant questions both from the perspectives of evaluating linguistic usage, and
describing it. Now what have we learned from all this? Let me summarize some
major points.
1) Evaluative Statements on specific instances of linguistic usage presuppose
knowledge of the functional properties of the formulations involved.
Consequently, distinguishing non-linguistic aspects of situations for the purpose
of such evaluations is constrained (not exhaustively determined) by the
properties of the linguistic elements.
2) In order to fulfil the justifying role they are supposed to play, Statements of
these properties must extend beyond the specific usage event under evaluation,
and in that sense be context-independent. If the term 'meaning' is used for
these properties, it should be limited to this usage, and not be used for referring
to elements of a specific Interpretation on a particular occasion.
3) In order for such Statements to be used in evaluations of specific events, they
must at the same time be context-sensitive. Useful context-independent
formulations of functional properties of linguistic elements will often contain
variables whose value can only be determined upon Interpretation.
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4) Both evaluation, Interpretation and semantic analysis can be consistently
descnbed m terms of a constramt satisfaction model, such that
meanmgs are not parts of mterpretations, but constramts on them,
• context is manifested m other (hnguistic and/or non-hnguistic) constramts
on mterpretations, they do not make meanmgs (hnguistic constramts)
change from one Situation to another, but may have the effect of enforcmg
an Interpretation in which the (m itself unaltered) constramt invoked by a
hnguistic element does not play a role, or has m fact a negative value
Notes
Another useful text for graspmg the complexities involved m (interrelated) theoretical
exphcations of 'meaning' and 'context', äs well äs related notions like 'Interpretation' and
'function', is Chapter l of Levinson (1983)
The usefulness of such an idea, in my view, is twofold First, it provides certam hnguistic
practices with a sound scientific basis Second, it provides Imguistics with an mdependent
domain of empincal considerations, to the extent that an analysis turns out to be useful, it
denves empincal support from that fact See Verhagen (1992) for an example
The logic of the above argument is transferable to such situations, though Formulated
abstractly The choice of functional distinctions must be constramed by distinctions
between textual features that can be estabhshed mdependently, and to which the functional
distinction can be systematically related
Note that for the purposes of this paper, I employ a notion of "function" that does not
mclude "hnguistic function" in phrases of the type "The function of hnguistic form Υ is
to X" Including this would clearly lead to vacuousness m Statements of the type "If the
function of communication is to X, the use of Υ is appropnate " The notion of "function"
that one must have m mmd for evaluative purposes is some effect of communication that
is mtended or assumed on the basis of knowledge of the commumcative Situation and the
actors in it, i e on the basis of knowledge of the context This is the reason why I talk
about functions here "äs aspects of contexts" Consequently, the terms are more or less
mterchangeable here, usually "context" seems to be the more appropnate term m
evaluation ("How appropnate is formulation Υ in context X7"), while "function" fits
better mto advice ("When your goal is to perform function X, (do not) use Y")
Cf Verhagen 1992 It may actually be better not to consider the latter type äs a passive
construction at all This is especially true for purposes of evaluation, which, mcidentally,
demonstrates the co-dependence of the selection of hnguistic distinctions on the purposes
for which they are used (somethmg I will argue for m general m section 3) There are
also analytical and histoncal arguments not to consider the constructions with zyn äs
passives, cf Cornehs & Verhagen (1995)
For a more detailed discussion of differences between passives in Enghsh and m Dutch,
see Cornehs (1996)
And perhaps, sufficiently unhke the situations m which a competmg hnguistic element
was used, m case there was a possibility of ambiguity, or an issue of 'choosing the nght
word' in some other sense
But, in this case, also a Professional like John Searle See Searle (1979), and the
discussion m Verhagen (1986), on which the followmg paragraphs are based
Still, a justification for this claim may be called for, I try to undertake such a justification
m Verhagen 1995
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10 It is at pomts hke this, I believe, that very fundamental choices of an often ideological
nature, mevitably enter the picture As I mentioned at the end of section l, l favor an
instrumental view of science, for which it is important that the problems to be solved are
partly mdependent from the theones used But a Imguist who does not adhere to such a
view, or for whom evaluation never constitutes an interestmg problem, does not have to
be convinced by these considerations at all, of course
11 Does that not make it unmtelligible that children learn to use 'simple' structures, e g
everyday words and simple clauses, before 'more complex' ones, such äs speciahzed
words and subordmated clauses7 No, it does not The reason is that the children do not
learn a new, more complex expression for communicatmg something that they already can
easily communicate otherwise Quite the contrary learnmg the advanced skills is,
simultaneously, learnmg to perform the related communicative task Mmimally, m
learnmg such advanced skills one acquires the means for domg thmgs straightforwardly
that previously required a great deal of effort, or were just too complex to accomplish A
companson with learnmg to use a tool may be helpful here When one learns to operate a
new tool, enablmg oneself to perform a task previously out of ränge, the report that one
has learned to use a more complex tool does not really give an adequate account of the
development of one's skills, the report that one has learned to perform a more complex
task, usmg a new tool, provides a better picture It makes sense, therefore, to say that the
acquisition of the ability to use such thmgs äs speciahzed lexicon and Subordination,
permits a simphfication of the cognitive tasks m communicatmg, and in fact may bring
certain tasks withm performance ränge for the first time In short children do not so
much learn more complex language, they learn to perform more complex cognitive tasks
(usmg language) In evaluatmg Claims about complexity, one should always be careful to
look for the Standard of companson m the nght place
12 Lakoff (1990) suggests that abstract topological properties are always preserved across
domams in a metaphoncal mapping, which would look hke a true context-mdependent
constramt (the so-called Invanance Hypothesis) As Lakoff mdicates at the end of Ins
paper, however, it is not yet clear how this hypothesis is to be construed As preservation
of the topological structure of the source domain1? That cannot be the case even in view of
such simple metaphors äs Myfather is a crab (Turner 1990) Takmg it äs the requirement
of preservation of structure m the target domain, äs Turner proposes, seems troublesome
to me m view of the fact that for some domams there are no non-metaphoncal
conceptualizations It might be that an attempt to state precisely what topological
properties are (äs required by Brugman 1990), will reveal no more than a redefimtion of
metaphor (some structure has to be mapped, after all, for callmg anythmg a metaphor),
makmg the hypothesis a property of our notion of metaphor rather than a new empincal
claim about a mechamsm of the mmd
13 For another demonstration that this phenomenon is not structural, consider the fact that
with another target domain, such features can be activated For example, m 1995 the BBC
broadcasted a documentary senes called "The death of Yugoslavia"
14 A general introduction mto connectiomsm is Rumelhart (1989), a bnef, general comment
on connectiomsm and language is Rumelhart (1988), while Elman (1991) gives an
approach to syntax (though defimtely not the only one in existence withm the
connectiomst Community) Sharkey (1992) is a volume of connectiomst papers on a
vanety of hnguistic issues An interestmg view on connectiomsm from a hnguistic point
of view is provided in section 123 (pp 525-536) of Langacker (1991) For Interpretation
äs constramt satisfaction, see especially Hutchms (1995 240ff), which has also been
mspirational for other parts of this paper
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15 For general arguments see the references mentioned in the previous footnote In linguistic
processmg, a possible lest case seems to be the question whether pragmatic mferences,
nnplicatures and the hke, are produced öfter computation of the assumed truth-conditional
meanmg, wluch would favor a rather stnct modular view, or computed simultaneously,
which would favor a more parallel view Psycholmguistic evidence äs provided in
Lundquist & Jarvella (1994) in my opmion pomts mto the latter direction For an opposite
view, see Moeschler (1992)
16 There will be more constramts, to other mterpretations äs well äs mutual ones, but they
are not really relevant to my present argument, so I leave that out for simplicity sake
17 For example, figure 4 depicts only one constramt per unit, and for no more than one
Interpretation, whereas an Interpretation can actually be better thought of äs a set of
positively connected units (cf Rumelhart 1989, Hutchms 1995 244/5), and units have
multiple connections to several other units (thus aspects of mterpretations) 1t is only in
such more reahstic elaborations that one can see how a phenomenon hke, for example,
polysemy may anse m a network But the minimal picture of figure 4 suffices for what I
want to argue here
18 Note that one would have a hard time trymg to distmguish the ordmary Situation äs
meanmgful and this one äs meanmgless in terms of lack of Intention to produce "red" m
the latter case traffic hghts usually operate automatically
19 Stnctly computationally, the solution of the problem might seem transparent The observer
with two bearmgs to take can see for himself which of the two is the beamiest, and he
can take it simultaneously with the one beanng taken by his colleague (assummg some
means of coordmating the timmg of observations) However, this is misleadmg, for it does
not take mto account that the bearmg Information must be propagated through a social-
cognitive System, and thus must be reported for further processmg by someone eise The
simple "rule of thumb" äs it is apphed does not differentiate the taking of the beanng m a
stnct sense and reportmg it, while decoupling these two processes precisely turns out to
be a necessary condition for a practicable solution m this type of Situation (see Hutchms
1995206-219 for details)
20 This is not to deny that the distmction might be made on other grounds, only that the
notion 'extra-lmguistic factors' is not gomg to do the job
21 It is perhaps worthwhile to note that this approach also allows for a fourth, denved, type
of evaluation, complementary to consistency, viz degree of redundancy Given a certain
number of constramts the strength of an Interpretation may become so high that addition
of another constramt, although consistent, does not actually increase its strength (in
connectiomst models, activation functions define sigmoid curves, thus implementmg the
idea of a natural maximum level of activation) The entire Situation should then in fact be
evaluated negatively too, not because of inconsistency but because the extra processmg
load does not 'pay off
22 Note that one should not say "the contexts in which it occurs", precisely because m some
contexts a linguistic element may not contnbute, or contnbute negatively to the




Acket, J M , & Stutterheim, C F P (1960), Stijlstudie en stijloefemng Haarlem Bohn ( l l t h ,
revised edition, edited by C F P Stutterheim, first prmted 1908)
Bolmger, D (1980), Language - TheLoaded Weapon The use and abuse of language today Lon-
don/New York Longman
Brugman, C (1990), What is the Invanance Hypothesis? Cogmtive Lmguistics l, 257-266
Chilton, P & Lakoff, G (1989), Foreign pohcy by metaphor CRL Newsletter, 3/5, 5-19 (Center
for Research in Language, Umversity of California at San Diego)
Cornelis, L H (1995), Passief en polyphonie Tijdschnft voor taalbeheersmg 17, 44-54
Cornehs, L H (1996), English and Dutch the passive difference Language Sciences 18,247-264
Cornelis L H (1997), Passive and perspective Amsterdam/Atlanta Rodopi
Cornehs, L & Verhagen, A (1995), Does Dutch really have a passive'' In M den Dikken & K
Hengeveld (eds), Lmguistics m the Netherlands 1995 Amsterdam/Philadelphia John
Benjamins, 49-60
Elman, J L (1991), Distnbuted representations, Simple Recurrent Networks, and Grammatical
Structure In Machme Learmng, 7, 195-225
Hutchms, E (1995), Cogmtion m the Wild Cambridge, Mass The MIT Press
Jansen, C J M (1995), Rekenen met taal Intreerede TU Eindhoven
Jong, M de (1995), Metaforen en milieubeleid Unpublished paper Utrecht Umversity
Kemmer, S & Verhagen, A (1994), The grammar of causatives and the conceptual structure of
events Cognitive Lmguistics 5, 115-156
Lakoff, G (1987), Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things What Categories Reveal about the Mind
Chicago Umversity of Chicago Press
Lakoff, G (1990), The Invanance Hypothesis is abstract reasomng based on image-schemas9
Cogmtive Lmguistics, l, 39-74
Lakoff, G (1991), Metaphor and war the metaphoncal System used tojustify war m the Gulf
Peace Research, 23, 25-32
Lakoff, G & Johnson, M (1980), Metaphors we live by Chicago/London The Umversity of
Chicago Press
Lammerts, A & Verhagen, A (1994), De oorlog m de krant In A Maes, P van Hauwermeiren,
L van Waes (red ), Perspectieven in taalbeheersmgsonderzoek Dordrecht ICG Publications,
375-384
Langacker, R W (1987), Foundations of Cognitive Grammar Volume I Theoretical Prerequisites
Stanford, CA Stanford Umversity Press
Langacker, R W (1991), Foundations oj'Cognitive Grammar Volume II Descriptive Application
Stanford, CA Stanford Umversity Press
Levmson, S C (1983), Pragmatics Cambridge Cambridge Umversity Press
Lundquist, L & R J Jarvella (1994), Ups and Downs in Scalar Inferences Journal ofSemantics,
11,33-53
Lyons, J (1977), Semantics Volume 2 Cambridge, etc Cambridge Umversity Press
Context, meaning and Interpretation, m a practical approach to linguistics 39
Moeschler, J (1992), The Pragmatic Aspects of Lmguistic Negation Speech Act, Argumentation
and Pragmatic Inference Argumentation 6, 51-76
Maureau, J H (1983), Goed en begrijpehjk schnjven een analyse van 40 jaar schnjfadviezen
Muiderberg Coutmho 2
Ortony, Andrew (ed ) (1979), Metaphor and Thought Cambridge Cambridge University Press
[Second, revised edition 1993]
Petnc, I (1992), Here is the news Predictmg hstenmg performance for news texts Dissertation
Utrecht University
Reddy, M J (1979), The Conduit Metaphor - A case of frame conflict in our language about
language In Ortony (ed ), 1979,284-324
Reichling, A (1967), Het woord Een Studie omtrent de grondslag van taal en taalgebrmk
Zwolle Tjeenk Willmk [Second unrevised edition, first edition 1935 ]
Rumelhart, D E (1979), Some problems with the notion of literal meanings In Ortony (ed ),
(1979), 78-90
Rumelhart, D E (1988), The connectiomst approach to language In Papers and Reports on Child
Language Development, 27, 168-174
Rumelhart, D E (1989), The Architecture of Mmd A Connectiomst Approach In Michael
I Posner (ed ), Foundations ofCognitive Science Cambridge, MA/London The MIT Press,
133-159
Sharkey, N (ed ) (1992), Connectiomst Natural Language Processing Readmgs front Connection
Science Dordrecht, etc Kluwer Academic Pubhshers
Searle, J R (1979), Metaphor In Ortony (ed ), 1979, 92-123
Turner, M (1990), Aspects of the Invariance Hypothesis Cognitive Linguistics, l, 247-255
Veer, A M van der (1994), De troonrede vaag"7 Dat is de vraag1 Unpublished paper Utrecht
University
Verhagen, A (1986), Betekemsen begrip m beeldspraak, ahnea-opbouw en mtonatie Voortgang,
7, 25-47
Verhagen, A (1992), Praxis of linguistics Passives in Dutch Cognitive Linguistics, 3, 301-342
Verhagen A (1995), Subjectification, syntax, and commumcation In D Stein & S Wnght
(eds ), Subjectivity and Subjectivisatton Lmguistic Perspecttves Cambridge Cambridge
University Press, 103-128
About the author
Arie Verhagen is associate professor of text linguistics at the Centre for Language and
Commumcation of Utrecht University (department of Dutch Language and Literature) His mam
research interests are m the area of the relation between grammar and discourse, and cogmtive
linguistics
